This paper studies the effects of financial restructuring announcements on short-term stock returns of banks and non-financial companies during the East Asian crisis. We find that the prices of bank stocks respond positively to announcements relating to government guarantees of bank liabilities. Non-financial companies increase in value upon the announcement of guarantees but announcements that favor the use of public funds for liquidity and capital support for banks negatively affect their stock prices. These results suggest that announcements of deposit guarantees may provide comfort to market participants during a crisis of confidence, but that the provision of public funds for bank bail-outs were not necessarily viewed as credible means to restore the health of the financial sector.
Introduction
The East Asian crisis began in Thailand in mid-1997, when an ailing financial sector, an export slowdown, and large increases in central bank credit to weak financial institutions triggered a run on the Baht. The crisis then spread to other countries in the region as common vulnerabilities and revaluations of risks in emerging markets triggered large capital outflows. The East Asian crisis countries took a variety of steps to address problems in their banking systems. Recent papers have begun to review the policy responses of the East Asian crises countries and assess the success of the policies followed in the different countries in terms of restoring the health of the bank and corporate sectors (Claessens, Klingebiel, Djankov 1999; Lindgren et al. 1999 ).
To improve our understanding of the impact of different policy responses to financial crises, we investigate how stock markets across East Asian countries reacted to the initial policy announcements of bank and financial restructuring. More specifically, we examine separately how the banking and the non-financial sectors fared upon announcement of different bank restructuring measures in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Our focus is on the announcement effect of five types of measures typically used by governments to restore overall public confidence and to revitalize financial and corporate sectors: liquidity support to banks, guarantees of bank liabilities, bank closures, the provision of public funds for the recapitalization of financial institutions, and the creation of publicly owned centralized asset management companies. This study will help to understand whether market participants perceived various policies as effective or ineffective in restoring the health of the financial sector.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on stock price responses during financial crises. Section 3 briefly depicts the financial restructuring experiences in East Asia. Section 4 presents the method and data followed by Section 5 that lays out the analysis and summarizes the results. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature on Stock Price Responses during Financial Crises
Our analysis incorporates the essentials of two similar approaches of research on the effects of financial crises on stock prices. The first one relates to the assessment of the market's perception of the effectiveness of policy measures that have been taken to resolve currency or banking crises. The second one concerns work that aims at investigating whether policy announcements affect stock prices during a financial crisis. In this section we briefly discuss these studies. Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998) investigate whether the policies announced by the Argentine government helped to prevent spillover effects of the Mexican crisis of 1994-95. Ganapolsky and Schmukler argue that those announcements that were successful in preventing contagion will have had positive impact on share prices. Ganapolsky and Schmukler find that the agreement of Argentina with the IMF had a strong positive impact on Argentinean stock market returns. However, policy measures such as the creation of a fiduciary fund for bank capitalization, the constitution of a fund to purchase non-performing loans and the establishment of deposit insurance did not have a strong effect on stock prices.
The analysis of Ganapolsky and Schmukler suggests that the agreement between the Argentine government and the IMF during the Mexican crisis restored confidence on the local stock market. also focus on the impact of IMF agreements but they concentrate on the value of bank stocks during the Asian crisis. Their sample consists of the listed banks in six Asian and four Western countries. The results indicate that IMF agreements with Asian countries had little effect on the value of local banks. Moreover, the stock prices of Western banks were also unaffected by the IMF bail out news. This suggests that the announcement of the IMF agreements did not reduce systemic risks because that would have led to an increase in the market value of Western banks.
A similar analysis is provided by Kho, Lee, and Stulz (1999) . The focus there is solely on US banks, which stock prices are followed during financial crises other than the East Asian one. They do find evidence of bank bailouts, and find that the value of banks with exposures to a crisis country is negatively affected by currency crises and that it responds positively to IMF or central bank bailouts. US banks without exposure to such countries are again mostly unaffected by crisis events in these countries. Djankov, Jindra and Klapper (2000) concentrate on the market value of nonfinancial firms that have a credit relation with insolvent banks. Their main goal is to analyze the effects of the resolution of bank insolvency on the market value of firms that borrow from these banks. They focus on the East Asian financial crisis and distinguish between four different exit-routes for insolvent banks: closure, foreign sale, domestic merger, and nationalization. Their results indicate that the announcement of these resolutions have different effects on the value of the borrowing firms. In particular, they find that a closure leads to a reduction in the value of firms that used to borrow from the closed bank. This suggests that relationships between banks and firms in these three Asian countries added value to the firms and that closures are disruptive because they end these relationships.
Peek and Rosengren (forthcoming) investigate the impact of various policy announcements by the Japanese government on the premium that Japanese banks have to pay on their Eurodollar and Euro-yen interbank loans relative to competing international banks. The only announcements that appear to have had a systematic effect on the "Japan premium" are ones involving well-specified concrete actions by the government. The most prominent example was reduction in the premium that accompanied the announcement of the injection of funds into the banking system by the government.
All the previous papers look at whether announcements concerning bailouts, IMF agreements or the resolution of bank insolvencies affect stock prices. Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) take a reverse approach and study whether market jitters (i.e. large movements in the price index of a national stock market) can be explained by government policy announcements during crises. This methodology is in sharp contrast with the standard event study methodology. Rather than defining event dates ex ante and assessing whether the market experienced abnormal returns on these dates, they select event dates based upon market jitters. Kaminsky and Schmukler focus on the stock market returns of nine East Asian countries during the 1997-98 period. They find that large movements often coincide with news about agreements with international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Their analysis therefore suggests that the announcement of such agreements, which tend to be accompanied by financial restructuring programs, in fact contains information that is not yet incorporated in equity prices.
Our work adds to this literature in two ways. First, we examine the impact of various policy announcements on both banks and non-financial firms. This allows us to study the response of the stock market at a more disaggregate level and permits us to investigate the impact of the policy announcements on the banking and non-financial sectors of the economy simultaneously. Second, we concentrate on a number of concrete policy measures to explore the immediate consequences of financial restructuring announcements that occur in the midst of a financial crisis. Our particular focus is on announcements made by East Asian governments during 1997 and 1998. The next section briefly introduces the different policies that were followed during the crisis period in these countries.
Financial Restructuring in East Asia: A Brief Review
A full blown financial crisis swept Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia and to a lesser extent Malaysia. The Thai devaluation in July of 1997 triggered a withdrawal of capital from the region as investors started to look more critically at financial sector weaknesses and macro-economic imbalances. The currency and banking crises resulted in a severe economic downturn in all East Asian economies. Governments in the four crises countries employed different restructuring strategies for their bank-and corporate sectors.
As is typical in most financial crises, the East Asian governments were slow to address financial distress (Waxman and Hunamalai, 1999) . They tried to keep insolvent institutions afloat by injecting liquidity (Table 1) -and in doing so, incurred large fiscal costs. The delayed and sometimes partial response of governments to emerging weaknesses of financial institutions led to financial turbulence and runs on financial institutions. Governments responded to the crisis in public confidence (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) or foreign currency outflows (Korea) by issuing unlimited guarantees on financial systems' liabilities during 1997 and early 1998.
Bank restructuring strategies.
The Government responses and progress on financial restructuring have varied considerably in the East Asian countries. Authorities in Korea and Malaysia moved relatively aggressively to strengthen their banking system through injections of public funds (with little conditionality attached) for recapitalizations, nationalizations, removal of bad debt, and mergers. The Thai authorities moved aggressively on finance companies, closing two-thirds of them. In contrast, the Thai government has given banks a transition period to raise capital and offered public funds with tight conditionality attached. Indonesia put a public recapitalization program in place, but bank restructuring is still today at an early stage. Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel (1999) .
Asset resolution strategies. The crisis countries have also taken different approaches to asset resolution (Table 2) . Authorities in Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia have actively removed bad loans from banks and transferred them to centralized, government-owned and -managed asset management companies. The Indonesian government has transferred $66 billion of the assets of closed banks and the worst loans of intervened and state banks-equivalent to 116 percent of the banking system's nonperforming loans and 48 percent of GDP-to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency. The Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) purchased about 26 percent of non-performing loans (worth $37 billion) at an average of 45 cents to the dollar. Malaysia's Danaharta asset management company has bought 50 percent of nonperforming loans (worth $14 billion) at discounts of 30-50 percent. In all three countries the transfer of assets has substantially reduced non-performing loans in banks. Thailand's government has left the responsibility for loan workout and asset recovery with banks. Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel (1999) , and Dado (2000) .
After a steep decline in output in 1998, the macro-economic condition of the four crises countries improved considerably during 1999 and growth turned positive. Yet, while governments have made significant strides and spent substantial resources to clean up their financial systems, banks in all crises economies have remained inadequately capitalized as their main clients, corporations, remain financially distressed (Claessens, Djankov, Klingebiel 1999) .
While the section above analyzed the financial restructuring strategies of the East Asian crises economies, it did not examine how the announcements of financial restructuring measures where received by the market. This will be assessed in the sections below.
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Method and Data
Sample and Event Study Setup
We concentrate our analysis on four East Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. All four of these countries experienced a serious financial sector crisis during the late 1990s and, as laid out in the previous section, used a variety of policy measures in response to it. To be able to analyze how these financial restructuring efforts were perceived by investors, we need precise information on when they were communicated to the public. We therefore use a large number of sources to obtain accurate data on the policy announcements. First of all, we investigate all the issues of the Asian Wall Street Journal from June 1997 until September 1998
1 . Second, we use official documents that are reported on the homepages of the central banks and the local governments of the four countries involved, the World Bank and the IMF. These relate to press releases of the local governments and central banks about financial restructuring policies and to so called Adjustment Loans Agreement and Letters of Intents, that among others detailed financial restructuring strategies that were presented to the World Bank and the IMF by the crises countries. Third, we rely on published reports by the World Bank and the IMF and papers by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a,b) , Enoch (2000) and Radelet and Sachs (1998) . All of these provide detailed information about the policies of East Asian governments during the financial crisis.
To properly capture the perceived effect of a policy in the event study, determining the precise time at which the information hits the market is crucial. An important timing issue concerns the problem of inside information. At the time the government makes the announcement, the information may have already been leaked to key market participants. Policy announcements will then contain little information for stock prices as the news is already incorporated. To accommodate for such effects, we will use an event window that includes the first trading day before the announcement date. This allows us to capture market re-valuations that immediately precede policy announcements. To the extent that the market's lead exceeds this single day, our analysis will fail to detect market responses, and this procedure may underestimate the effect on the stock prices. Stretching the event window even further to include earlier trading days seems inappropriate, however, because it would increase the risk of erroneously attributing market developments to specific policy announcements or simply introducing noise that would bias our findings towards zero. This danger especially exists when the market is volatile, which will obviously be the case during a financial crisis. For this same reason, we decided to include only the first trading day after the event date in our analysis. Hence, the event window that we will use consists of three days: the event date, the first trading day before the event date and the first trading day after the event date.
In interpreting the market response, it is important to consider the credibility of the policy announcement. As Peek and Rosengren (forthcoming) found, general policy statements not associated with very specific action plans had little effect in Japan. If the market does not believe that the government will follow through, then a lack of a stock market reaction may reflect a lack of credibility rather than a lack of perceived impact of such a policy. Thus, a negligible reaction to a policy announcement does not necessarily imply that the market believes that the measures would have no impact but it may also reflect an assessment by market participants that the measures will not be effectively implemented. As we will describe below, the Indonesian government, for example, made very similar policy announcements on multiple occasions, suggesting that the earlier announcements did not result in implementation of the policy.
Stock Market Data
Our stock market data are obtained from the Global Indices series of Datastream, which are provided on a daily basis in local currencies. Datastream constructs these indices for a large number of countries by selecting the most important and liquid stocks of their local markets. There are approximately 50 stocks in these indices for Indonesia and Thailand. For South Korea and Malaysia, Datastream selects around 100 stocks. Datastream then distinguishes between different sectors and industries.
The Global Indices are particularly useful for our purpose because they contain separate series for banks and non-financial firms.
2 In each of the countries we examine, bank stocks constitute a significant fraction of total market capitalization.
3 Thus, using the regular Datastream composite/market index for these countries would not allow us to distinguish movements in bank stocks from movements in the rest of the market. The Global Indices, however, allow us to obtain a clear indicator for the reactions on the stock market that are specific to banks by subtracting the return of non-financial stocks from the bank stocks return. Throughout the paper, we refer to this as the excess return of bank stocks. Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the daily stock returns. The data for the years [1997] [1998] show that average daily returns on bank stocks were negative in all four countries over those two years. Except for Malaysia, banks seriously under-performed non-financial stocks over that period. Nevertheless, because of the extremely volatile nature of the markets during this period, average daily excess returns for the banks are not statistically different from zero in any of the countries. This is also true for daily excess returns, but is not the case for sub-periods. If we distinguish between 1997 and 1998, however, we find that the underperformance of banks in Indonesia and Malaysia is statistically significant in 1997. In Malaysia, bank stocks then recovered to outperform the rest of the market in 1998. In Korea, the bulk of the under-performance of banks is concentrated in 1998. 
A Chronology of Financial Restructuring Announcements
Appendix 2 of this paper contains the results of our search for bank policy announcements. The chronology shows that there were relatively few financial restructuring announcements in Malaysia where the financial crisis appeared to be less pronounced. For Indonesia, the bulk of the announcements took place in 1998. Also, the Indonesian government seems to have made the same policy announcements on different dates. For example, both the phasing out of liquidity support and the tightening of loan classification and provisioning were announced by the government on several occasions in late 1997 and 1998.
The chronology also reveals that governments frequently made multiple policy announcements on a single day. Especially the announcement of IMF agreements tended to be accompanied by statements concerning different measures to reform the financial sector. As a result, we might face a mixed event as we investigate the impact of the announcement of a specific policy measure. This makes it more difficult to asses the effect of the specific announcement. We will attempt to disentangle the effects of the different policies in the next section.
As a preliminary analysis, we relate the policy announcements in Appendix 2 to the incidence of large movements in the prices of bank stocks. This will reveal whether the announcements tend to contain information for market participants that is relevant for the stock prices of banks. If the announcements were already communicated informally to the market or if they were fully anticipated by the market, we do not expect to observe many jitters around the event date. In that case, studying the short-term effects of policy announcements on stock prices will not be very promising.
To investigate whether bank stocks indeed tended to be moved by financial restructuring announcements, we selected the 25 largest swings in each year of the return on bank stocks and of the excess return on banks. We do this for each country and for each year. Assuming 250 trading days per year, these dates represent the 10% largest movements of the year (in absolute values). We then check which of these days fall inside the event window of the financial restructuring announcements (which includes the event date and the first trading day before and after that date).
The results of this exercise, which are reported in Table A2 of Appendix 2, show that policy announcements are frequently accompanied by relatively high or low returns on bank stocks and excess returns. 6 This holds for all four countries, suggesting that the announcement contained news that was relevant to the market in each country. In the next section, we analyze these responses in detail.
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Analysis and Results
We focus on five types of bank policy announcements. These concern announcements regarding:
(1) the type of liquidity support policy of the central bank, (2) a guarantees of bank liabilities, (3) bank closures and interventions, (4) capital support policy of the government, (5) the establishment of publicly-owned and managed asset management companies.
A recent paper by Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) has shown that this set of crisis management strategies can be systematically linked to fiscal costs of banking crises for a large sample of countries. Given their sizeable impact on fiscal costs we belief it is reasonable to presume that the announcement of these policies has had an impact on asset prices as well.
The first step we take is to extract these types of announcements from the chronology provided in Appendix 2 and to calculate the associated returns using an event window of three days. This will provide a data set of policy events and stock market responses. The second step then is to analyze these data in search of patterns in stock market responses.
Panels A-E of Table A1 in Appendix 1 show the outcome of the first step of our analysis. Each panel concentrates on a different policy announcement and the events are grouped per country. The panels also indicate whether or not the announcement was simultaneous with other financial restructuring announcements and it reports the other policy measures if this is indeed the case. The returns associated with each event are averages per day for the event window. By using averages in stead of cumulative returns, we create comparability across announcements that are made over the weekend. For those events, the window only consists of two trading days (instead of three). Statistically significant returns are bold faced and accompanied by * or **, depending on whether they are significant at the 10 percent or 5 percent level. Few of the individual entries are associated with a statistically significant stock market response. Now that we have data on stock price responses to policy announcements, we can use them to determine whether there is a pattern in the response of the stock market. For this, we need to deal with two issues. First, we would like to exploit the responses to each type of policy announcement by using all the individual announcements. By focussing on a single event in the way we do in Table A1 , i.e. by calculating t-statistics for each individual event, we neglect the information that is contained in the responses to similar announcements that are made at a different time or in another country. For example, it may be that closures and interventions negatively affect bank stocks in each country but that the effect of each announcement is generally too small to detect if one focuses on a single event. The second issue relates to the mixed nature of some of the announcements. As we argued earlier, it will be difficult to assess the effect of a specific announcement if the government declares different policy measures at the same time. Table A1 shows that our sample of policy events contains many mixed events. The Korean government for example, made announcements concerning all five policy variables on a single day (December 5, 1998) .
We now proceed in the following way. First we determine the average stock price response for each type of policy announcement. We thereby neglect the specific country in which the event took place, and the relative importance of subsequent announcements in a country. In doing so, we further subdivide the announcements concerning liquidity support and capital support into announcement that either favor or disfavor the use of public funds. We then have an indication of how the stock market reacted to each type of announcement while using all the relevant individual events. After that, we set-up a regression analysis that attempts to address the problems associated with mixed events and that allows us to assess the statistical significance of the results.
Through this type of analysis we wish to establish the impact of the announcements on the market, where we distinguish between financial and non-financials. As a benchmark for calculating abnormal returns we simply use a zero response, that is we set normal performance returns equal to zero on event dates, and consider returns that differ significantly from zero to be abnormal. Our analysis thus differs from standard event studies that use a model to create a benchmark for the asset returns during event dates.
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To avoid issues of the appropriate model specification for our countries during the sample period, we assume that the mean return is constant at zero. The null hypothesis in our empirical work thus is that returns are equal to zero on event dates.
As a preliminary analysis, we investigate whether those policy announcements that suggest an increase in the use of public funds to support banks affect stock prices, thus combining several types of government support measures. If the transfer of funds was unanticipated by the market and credible, we expect that the prices of bank stocks will respond positively. The effect on the stock prices of non-financial firms is less obvious. On the one hand, if banks are important for these firms to conduct their business, public support for banks might affect stock prices positively. On the other hand, stock prices of non-financial may be negatively affected. The transfer of public funds to the financial sector might be costly for non-financial firms as the government needs to recoup the costs, by for example increasing overall taxes. Or the market may perceive that the measures announced will not effectively restore the health of the banking system and therefore, banks may continue to curtail their lending activities. The impact on the nonfinancials, however, must be interpreted with caution.
For the banks, policy announcements related to their restructuring and bail-out are likely to be the key driving forces behind the daily movements; for the non-financials, this is less likely to be the case. To the extent that other news events are influencing the non-financials, any interpretation of the movements in the non-financials will be less precise.
We first pool all the announcements reported in Table A1 into one data set. Avoiding duplication, we obtain a sample of 39 events. We then determine which of these events involve an announcement that suggests the use of public funds to support banks. Assuming that government support for the establishment of asset management companies involved the transfer of public funds to banks, there are 22 of these announcements. We then regress the stock price responses on a constant and a dummy variable indicating (an increase in) the use of public funds. The results are reported in Table 4 .
Table 4: Regression Results for the Announcement Effect of Public Support for Banks
The sample consists of the event dates that are reported in the Table A1 of Appendix 1, which are pooled into one database. Avoiding duplication, this produces a sample of 39 announcements. The dependent variables in the regressions are the average daily stock returns for each event, where the returns are calculated using a window of three days. The independent variables are discrete, where the dummy variable equals one if on the event date an announcement was made that indicate a transfer of public funds to banks. This holds for announcements that suggest that banks will be helped through the ease of liquidity support, the announcement of government guarantees for depositors and creditors, the announcement of public funds for bank recapitalizations and the announcement that the government will support the establishment of asset management companies. The t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
Return Banks
Return The announcement effect of public support for banks is positive when considering the return of bank stocks or their excess returns. This finding parallels that in Peek and Rosengren (forthcoming) that policy announcements involving the provision of funds to the banking sector have the strongest effect on the banking sector relative to other types of announcements of government policy towards the banks. For non-financials, there is no effect of these types of announcements relative to the others. Table 5 contains the stock price responses for each of the different types of policy announcements. The averages are calculated from the data presented in Appendix 1 using all the events in each panel. The number of announcements involved is presented in parenthesis. Let us first look at the column for the return of bank stocks. The average response to the announcement of a guarantee on bank liabilities equals a little more than 1.6 percent per day. Assuming that there are three trading days in all the event windows, this implies a cumulative increase in bank stock prices of roughly 5 percent. Reactions of similar magnitude are found for the twelve announcements that relate to asset management companies. The non-financial stocks also move in a positive direction upon these announcements, suggesting that the market perceived them as good for both the banking and non-financial corporate sector. The government guarantee of bank liabilities even brings forth a larger positive movement from the non-financial sector than from the banking sector.
The announcements of bank closures or interventions tend to have a small effect on the stock returns of banks and a small negative excess return for them. Announcements of more freely available (more restrictive) liquidity support for banks lead to positive (negative) excess returns for the banks. The absolute returns to the non-financial sector go in the opposite way: non-financial decline (rise) when more liberal (more restrictive) liquidity support is announced. Public funds for recapitalization lead to a positive excess return for the banks, although both the banks and the non-financials have negative absolute returns. Although there are only four observations of announcements indicating that the government will not provide public funds for recaps, banks experience a positive excess return and both the banks and non-financials have positive absolute returns. These responses suggest that announcements regarding the non-availability of public funds for bank recapitalizations signal to the market that the banking problems were not as severe as had been expected and/or that the government may be able to contain the fiscal costs of the crisis. This interpretation would also be consistent with the positive reaction by both banks and non-financials to the announcement of restrictions on liquidity support. The table contains the stock price responses for five different types of policy announcements. The averages are calculated using the data presented in the tables in Appendix 1. For each type of policy announcement, the average daily return is calculated using all the events in the four countries. The number of announcements that is used is presented in parenthesis. The 'Excess Return of Banks' is calculated by subtracting the return on non-financial stocks from bank stocks return. The announcements concerning liquidity support and capital support are further subdivided into announcements that favor or disfavor the use of public funds for liquidity or capital support.
Return Announcements that include the use of public funds for recapitalizing banks' balance sheets
Announcement that preclude the use of public funds for recapitalizing banks' balance sheets
Announcement regarding the establishment of a publicly-owned, centrally managed asset management company
(#) = total number of policy announcements used to calculate the response on the stock market
In the above discussion of the results of Table 5 , we have not investigated the statistical significance of the stock market responses. Analyzing the significance requires us to calculate the standard errors for each policy announcement and for each stock return measure. Because the data comes from different countries and because the number of trading days that is used to calculate the response to each individual varies, this is not a straightforward task.
To tackle both of these issues, we design a regression approach using all the individual announcements that are reported in Table A1 of Appendix 1. Again, we pool all the announcements reported in Table A1 into one data set. Next we transform the policy announcements to discrete variables that can be used as independent variables in a regression. Announcements of guarantees, closures or interventions in financial institutions and the establishment of a publicly owned centrally managed asset management companies to which non-performing loans of banks are transferred to are transformed into dummy variables that equal one if on the event date such an announcement was made. Liquidity support and capital support policies are captured by two separate variables that equal -1, 0 or 1. In the case of liquidity support, a (-1) then refers to announcements that imply that liquidity support will be restricted; a (1) then refers to those types of announcements that suggest that liquidity support will be freely available. In the case of capital support, a (-1) refers to those types of announcements that preclude the use of public funds for recapitalizing banks' balance sheets, a (1) refers to those types of announcements that imply that public funds will be made available. By including only the 39 events related to the announcement of restructuring policy measures in the analysis, our regression results gauge the announcement effect of each type of policy measure relative to a zero return benchmark. This allows us to determine which specific type of policy measures have had an effect on stock prices and the direction of the response.
Using the response to each announcement as dependent variables and the transformed policy announcements as independent variables, we then perform OLS regressions. By including indicator variables for each type of announcement, we can try to disentangle the effects of each type of policy announcement when there is a mixed event. We also include an indicator variable in the regressions to control for the effects of an IMF agreement on stock prices. This variable equals one if on the event date an IMF agreement was announced or if the government declared that it made significant progress during the IMF negotiations.
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 6 and are generally consistent with our earlier discussion. The return on banks is positive and statistically significant with respect to the announcement of guarantees on banks' liabilities. For the nonfinancials, announcements concerning guarantees on bank liabilities are positive and statistically significant. Stock prices of non-financials, however, seem to react negatively to announcements that liquidity support will be freely available and capital support will be provided to strengthen banks' balance sheets. Announcements with respect to the establishment of setting up a publicly owned asset management company have no effect on stock prices.
The IMF agreement dummy is negative and statistically significant in the regression for the return of non-financials. This suggests that the macro-economic policies laid out in the IMF agreements may have been perceived by the market as having adverse effects on non-financial firms or may have been viewed by market participants as a signal that the situation was more serious than expected. The sample of IMF related events is limited to those days on which announcements were made concerning the five policy variables that we focus on. Our data set is not constructed to capture all the announcements of IMF agreements or progress in the negotiations. The sample consists of the event dates that are reported in the Table A1 of Appendix 1, which are pooled into one database. Avoiding duplication, this produces a sample of 39 announcements. The dependent variables in the regressions are the average daily stock returns for each event, where the returns are calculated using a window of three days. The independent variables are all discrete. The variable 'Liquidity Support' equals one if there was an announcement that liquidity support would be made freely available. It equals minus one if an announcement was made that liquidity support was to be restricted. The variables 'Guarantees for Depositors and Creditors' and 'Closure/Intervention' are dummies that equal one if the government announced guarantees on that date or if there was a closure or intervention in a financial institution respectively. The 'Capital Support' dummy equals one if capital support was available and minus one if capital support was not available. The 'Asset Management Company' variable is a dummy that equals one if the government announces its intention to set up a publicly-owned centrally managed asset management company. The 'IMF' variable is a dummy that takes the value one if on the event date, an IMF agreement was announced or if the government declared that it made significant progress in the IMF negotiations. The t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. To conclude our data analysis, we briefly look at the differences in stock responses across countries. In constructing Table 5 and 6, we have ignored the specific country in which the announcement was made. To investigate whether policy announcements were interpreted differently across countries than Table 5 and 6 suggest, we reproduce Table 5 and 6 for each country. The results for the returns of bank stocks and non-financials are reported in Table 7 and 8 respectively. 
The figures in Table 7 indicate that the announcement of guarantees positively affected the value of bank stock in all countries but in Thailand. In turn, the positive effect of the announcement regarding the establishment of asset management companies was apparent in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand 9 , but not in Indonesia. A similar conclusion applies to the announcement effect of guarantees when we look at the returns of non-financial stocks. Table 8 shows that Thailand is again the only country in which these types of announcements did not seem to lead to a significant market appreciation. In addition, the response of non-financial stocks in Thailand is also different than the regression analysis would suggests with respect to announcements regarding liquidity and capital support. For example, the announcement of a more restrictive liquidity support policy was associated with a decline in stock prices of non-financials. This is in contrast with the regression results in Table 6 . The country-by-country break down of the data in Tables 7 and 8 suggests that the patterns we found in our earlier aggregate analysis seem to apply to Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia. The data for Malaysia and Korea fit in nicely with all the conclusions for the specific policy announcements. The data for Indonesia show only one major divergence, which relates to the announcement effect of establishing a publicly-owned asset management companies on the return of bank stocks which decline. This is somewhat surprising as one may have thought that the bailout effect, i. e. the transfer of assets to the AMCs at inflated prices would affect bank stock positively. One possible explanation for the negative stock market response may be that the market may have been concerned that the transfer of massive amounts of assets to a publicly owned agency adversely affected the overall payment discipline even of performing debtors. In addition, the market may have suspected that the massive amount of bad debt on the books of a government agency susceptible to political pressure and with limited resolution capacity may adversely affect the resolution of those loans remaining on the banks' books.
The responses for Thailand appear to have a somewhat different pattern. The announcement effect of public guarantees on both bank stocks and non-financial stocks are largely absent. Announcements regarding the non-availability of public funds for recaps and announcements regarding the provision of public funds for recaps both affect bank stock negatively. The negative announcement effect of "no public funds" for bank recaps may have adversely affected banks' stock prices because the market perceived that these institutions would be financially to weak to restructure on their own. Also, the market may have reacted negatively to the announcement of a public recap scheme because it perceived the capital support package as not generous enough to restore the financial health of the banking system. Moreover, the announcement effect of public guarantees on both bank and non-financials is largely absent. Bank returns in Thailand react negatively to the announcement of a guarantee whereas bank stocks in other countries react strongly positive. There are two potential explanations for this phenomenon. One, bank liabilities may have already been perceived to be covered by an (implicit) government guarantee. Or, the market perceived the issuance of a guarantee not as a credible way to address the ensuing banking crisis.
Implications and Lessons
Although we must be cautious in drawing strong policy conclusions from a small number of observations, our analysis of the reactions to bank restructuring policy announcements during the East Asian financial crisis has revealed some suggestive patterns that merit further investigation. The patterns are roughly consistent across Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia but apply to Thailand to a lesser extent.
We find that the prices of bank stocks as well as non-financials respond positively to announcements relating to government guarantees on bank liabilities. Banks stocks did not respond to either announcements concerning the establishment of a governmentowned centrally managed asset management company or announcements that include public recapitalization schemes aimed at strengthening banks' capital base and generous liquidity support programs. The non-financial companies, however, tended to react negatively to announcements with regards to the use of public funds for capital support and generous liquidity support for financial institutions.
Although we know that guarantees are costly over the long run ( Honohan, Klingebiel 2000) , these results suggest that markets perceived the announcement of government guarantees on bank liabilities as positive for both financial and non-financial corporations. Announcements of guarantees appear to have provided comfort to market participants over the short run. The stock price decline of non-financials as a reaction to announcements that include the use of public recapitalization schemes and more liberal liquidity support may have a number of explanations. The market may have been concerned that public funds per se would not restore the financial health of the institutions. Rather than perceiving that the funds would be used to restructure bank balance sheets and operations and allow banks to engage in meaningful corporate restructuring, funds provided by the government may not have been perceived as sufficient. Alternatively, the markets may have interpreted the announcements of increased public support as a signal that financial institutions were in a financially weaker position than previously anticipated. Finally, the decline in the stock price for nonfinancial companies as a reaction to the announcement of generous liquidity support may indicate that markets did not perceive the extension of liquidity support a credible enough measure to address the financial problems in banks. 
Appendix 1 Table A1: Stock Returns and Financial Restructuring Announcements: Liquidity Support (A), Guarantees of Bank Liabilities (B), Closures/Interventions (C), Capital Support (D), Asset Management Companies (E).
The returns reported in the final three columns are the average daily returns for each event. We have used a three day event window to measure stock price responses: the event date, the first trading day after the event day and the first trading day before the day of the event. If the event falls in a weekend, the stock market response is calculated using the Monday and Friday returns only. If the first trading day before the event was more than 3 days back because the stock exchange was closed during the other days, the event window only consists of the event date and the first trading day after the event. An '(M)' indicates whether or not the event was mixed with other policy announcements. These are then reported in square brackets in the first column. * and ** denote that the stock price response was significantly different from zero at the 10% and 5% respectively when using a t-test. The standard deviation of the average daily return during the event is calculated as v(1/k)?s(i,j), where k is the number of days used in calculating the response of the stock market (i.e. 2 or 3) and s(i) is the standard deviation of the daily stock returns for country i and return series j for the years 1997-1998 (See Table 1 • Seoul Bank and Korean First Bank announce that the government will inject in total 1.4 billion won in these banks in exchange for shares.
12/08/97 *2.93 1.61 -1.32
• Letter of Intent states that existing shareholders will bear the first burden. In addition, Seoul Bank and Korean First Bank will be placed under intensive supervision and will be taken over, resulting in a equity write down. [IMF agreement, ceiling on foreign ownership will be completely lifted as of Dec 1998.] 12/24/97 M -0.10 -1.46 -1.37 • Announcement that the government will establish an asset management company. The AMC will absorb the assets of the 7 banks that were intervened in on April 4 as well as the troubled assets of other IBRA banks. [Government will issue $18 billion in bonds to recapitalize banking sector through IBRA.] 04/10/98 M -1.56 -2.20 -0.64
• Statement that mid-July, a presidential decree will be issued providing appropriate legal power to the IBRA and its Asset Management Unit to deal with assets. The AMU will both serve as an entity to which bad assets of frozen banks by IBRA and as an entity to which bad assets of banks that are relatively strong that are recapitalized by the government. Note: Government also made announcements concerning the set up of a AMC to deal with the assets of finance companies that were already suspended, but these are neglected here.
* indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level ** indicates significantly different from zero at the 5% level
Appendix 2: A Chronology of Financial Restructuring Announcements during the Asian Crisis and Bank Jitters
This appendix contains a chronology of policy announcements made by the governments of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. It primarily contains announcements concerning the government's policy towards the financial sector. The sources for these events are: The Asian Wall Street Journal (all issues from June 1997-September 1998), official documents that are reported on the homepages of the IMF, central banks and local governments of the four countries involved, the IMF (1999a,b) reports and papers by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a,b) , Enoch (2000) and Radelet and Sachs (1998) .
We also relate these announcements to bank jitters, i.e. strong movements of bank stocks in the local market. A jitter is defined as a stock price movement whose absolute value is so large that it represent one of the 25 largest movements of that year. The jitters are determined for both the excess return on the banking index and the uncorrected return on the banking index. Excess returns are calculated as the return on bank stocks minus the return of non-financials. These data are taken from Datastream's Global Indices. The days for measuring whether a jitter occurred include the event day as well as the first trading day before and after the event date. The returns for the jitters are reported as well:
an 'E' stands for excess return on bank index while a 'B' stands for the return on the bank index. Events that are accompanied by jitters are in ITALICS and the returns that represent jitters are both in ITALICS and underlined. The thresholds for the jitters are reported in Table A2 . Aug. 18: South Korea says it will help troubled financial institutions by buying assets of ailing institutions through KAMCO, which is allowed to raise its funding with 1.5 trillion won. Principle agreement about a special loan to Korea First Bank (KFB) from KAMCO to meet liquidity problems. It remains unclear whether the central bank will also provide special loans to KFB or other banks.
Aug. 25: Government announces that it will provide special loans at below market rates to KFB and some merchant banks. Guarantee of foreign/external liabilities of Korean banks. The government will provide capital support to KFB by acquiring stocks and bonds (no amounts named). The government allows KAMCO to form a 3.5 trillion won fund (in stead 1.5 trillion) to buy bad loans. Jan. 11: South Korean officials object against plans for large-scale conversion of short-term commercial bank debt into government bonds.
Jan. 16: Agreement with foreign banks for a complete roll over of bank debt that is due in the 1Q98.
Jan. 29: Agreement (in principle) between Korea and foreign banks to restructure short-term debt (debt service suspended through roll-over) finalized: $26 billion will be converted into debt with 1-3 years of maturity, which will be backed partially by the government. Korea thereby resisted to bailout foreign banks.
Jan. 30: Revocation of licenses of 10 merchant banks that were suspended early december. 4.59
March 3: Central bank announces the country's sixth-largest bank (Sime) had recorded massive losses and that it will need fresh capital to stay in business.
March 5: Prime Minister pledges to use state funds to aid the country's ailing banks because these would collapse otherwise. The premier didn't say how much money might be used, or how it would be employed.
March 12: Deputy Prime Minister declares that Malaysia is committed to pursuing reforms similar to those prescribed by the IMF, which includes letting troubled firms go bankrupt. The government will not bailout troubled firms.
March 24: Further details of economic program announced. There will be a new liquidity support facility, but it will include penalty rates and full collateralization. Public funds for recapitalizations will be available but the government will only inject capital into government-owned banks or in companies and banks in which the government holds a stake. Sharp raise in capital requirement for finance companies (minimum as well as ratio). Buyers of finance companies will get a one-year government guarantee on the value of their acquisition. All banks will be subjected to intensive and rigorous supervision (including stress tests). Greater transparency and better loan classification and provisioning standards. Limitation on single party lending,
May 13: Government reveals that stress-tests show that three banks need capital injections. Amount needed is still being studied. June 4: Government states that it hopes to raise 25 billion ringgit ($6.37 billion) to fund the AMC.
July 13: Announcement by Finance minister of SPV to complement Danaharta: Strategic shareholder that should recapitalize and restructure weak banks by taking equity stakes.
July 16: Legislation passes parliament to launch AMC (Danaharta).
Aug. 6: Malaysia's Finance Minister says that the recapitalization fund, called Danamodal, will involve a $3.9 billion program.
be subject to conditionality and at higher rates. Creditors of finance companies that are suspended will incur losses but the claims of depositors and creditors of other finance companies and banks are guaranteed. Banks should make loan loss provisions on the basis of stricter classification requirements and raise additional capital. Severely undercapitalized institutions that cannot raise their capital to the legally required level will be taken over by the Financial Institutions Development Fund, which will involve capital write downs of existing shareholders. No public funds for corporate or household borrowers. Establishment of AMC is announced, which only serves to handle assets of intervened fi's. Participation of foreigners in banks will be encouraged. All other kinds of improvements for financial sector are announced in general terms. Oct. 10: Thai Finance Minister says that capital adequacy ratios will be raised from 8.5% to 12%.
Aug
Oct. 13 and 14: Thai government announces detailed strategy for restructuring financial sector: Law will be amended so that control by BoT over fi's can be exercised over institutions that have large losses and that are unable to recapitalize. BoT threatens that for those banks, shareholder equity will be written down to absorb losses and management will be replaced. Clarification of policy concerning suspended finance companies: creation of AMC and Financial Restructuring Agency (FRA) to implement and oversee this resolution process. FRA will also have responsibility for deposit guarantees. Loan classification and provisioning will be tightened by the year 2000. Foreign ownership limits on Thai banks and finance companies will be removed. 5 emergency decree will be passed by the cabinet within the next week to set up the agency and to strengthen the power of the central bank.
Nov. 14: Details on loan provisioning and accrued interest.
Nov. 18:
Thailand's new government announces that it will stick to the IMF program. The government will close loss-making finance firms and separate their good assets from bad assets. Feb. 6: Central bank seizes control of two midsize banks. Equity is almost completely written down and the banks are recapitalized by the FDIF. The same was done for a the Bangkok Bank of Commerce, which has been under government control since May 1996.
Feb. 24:
Thai plan further modified, agreement on third IMF program. Acceleration of restructuring of financial system with respect to privatization of intervened banks. Best practice banking standards and better supervision BoT. Acceleration of asset classification and loan provisioning policies through memoranda of understanding with undercapitalized banks but no immediate enforcement (for which banks feared).
March 4:
Thai central bank announces that the total amount of loans they had outstanding to troubled financial institutions equaled $16.4 billion on Feb. 19 and that it has spent $25.5 billion since mid-1996 to prop up troubled financial institutions.
March 22:
Central banks says that commercial banks need to raise $5 billion in new capital to comply with tightened capital rules that will be officially announced this month.
March 31: New rules for Thai banks officially announced by the central bank: new loan-classification system and new provisisoning levels.
May 13: Thai central bank governor says there will be no more closures of domestic financial institutions but that the central bank may have to step in to help some survive.
May 14:
Thai central bank says it may take over two cash-strapped finance companies.
May 18: Intervention in 7 finance companies that were unable to raise capital, need to write down capital. Aug. 4: Thailand's central bank and the private sector reach a broad framework for the restructuring of nonperforming loans. Legally nonbinding framework which lays down the steps through which creditors and debtors can work through a restructuring of debts.
Aug. 5:
The Bank of Thailand announces that it will offer a five-year money back guarantee to foreign investors taking over troubled Thai banks and finance companies. 
